RESEARCH
Research
My research focuses the philosophy of emotion and the many ways in which emotions contribute to our overall rationality. My views of what an emotion is are influenced by theories in both philosophy and psychology. In general, I try to have my views on emotional rationality be consistent with a wide range of theories concerning what is an emotion. More recently, my research has been focusing on anticipatory emotions, emotion regulation, and the roles that emotions play in social communication.
Writing
Publications
“Emotion Regulation as Resurrection: Disability & Music,” (w Rebecca Jiggens) Embodying the Music & Death Nexus: Consolations, Salvations, & Transformations, J. Shadrack, ed., forthcoming.
Abstract
In this chapter, we consider music as a tool for emotional regulation in relation to disability, which can be employed to counter the dehumanisation of disabled people that arises from unregulated emotional responses to disability. Responding to Julia Kristeva’s presentation of non-disabled encounters with disability as causing a physical or psychical death, Alison Duncan Kerr’s arguments on the rationality of regulating emotions in encounters where unregulated emotions have negative effects on the self and others are brought together through Rebecca Jiggens’ cultural model of understanding the significance of disability to illustrate the irrationality and moral paucity of ableism. We argue that music can play a role in regulating the emotions typically felt towards the disabled. Kristeva’s idea that disability wounds or even kills the abled is insightful, but if we are right, then the tight connection between death and emotional reactions to disability could be overcome through the process of emotion regulation.
“To Envy an Algorithm,” The Moral Psychology of Envy, S. Protasi, ed. R & L Intl, 2022.
Abstract
One of the biggest concerns for artificial intelligence (AI) is the interaction between humans and artificially intelligent agents. There is no evolutionary precedent that dictates how these interactions ought to take place or how best to understand these interactions. We are still learning as a species how to socially interact with AI. Within this context, it is natural to emphasise the elements of human experience, like emotions, that are usually only directed at other humans. Emotions are commonly thought of as a uniquely human phenomenon—though there is strong evidence that other animals experience emotions as well (Paul and Mendl 2018). In particular, social emotions (e.g., envy, jealousy, guilt, embarrassment) are especially difficult to understand in the context of interactions with AI agents. This chapter focuses on one aspect of this challenge: the propriety of feeling envy toward an algorithm, a computer programme, a machine, or a robot. By ‘propriety’ I mean whether it can be fitting to feel envy towards an AI agent. I focus on the AI agent AlphaGo, as a case study where it might appear reasonable for one to feel envious of AI. I argue that, in the right circumstances, one can feel a fitting (and warranted) bout of envy toward an algorithm. Having an emotion toward an object need not require the object capable of feeling an emotion itself. One can feel envy toward an algorithm, like AlphaGo; this bout of envy can be both fitting and warranted.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Philosophical Psychology 34.4, 2021: 453-473.https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1915969
Abstract
Much of the recent work in psychology (and affective science) has shown that humans regulate their emotions nearly constantly, sometimes well and sometimes poorly. I argue that properly regulating one’s emotions displays emotional rationality, and failing to do so displays emotional irrationality. If an agent feels an emotion that is obviously problematic for the agent to feel and she is aware that it is problematic, then the agent ought to regulate her emotions in future similar situations. To capture this aspect of emotional rationality, I introduce the concept of imprudence, which is meant to capture a familiar way that we assess each other’s emotions, despite the fact that it has yet to be a factor in the literature on emotions in philosophy, psychology, or affective science.
“Artificial Intelligence, Gender, and Oppression,” Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, W. L. Filho, ed. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95687-9_107
Abstract
This chapter focuses on one particular type of injustice that AI technologies and applications can cause, gendered oppression.
“Emotions, Rationality, and Gender,” Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, W. L. Filho, ed. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95687-9_106
Abstract
This chapter argues about the detriment of the gendered perspective on emotions and the overall benefit of better understanding of emotions for all people, but in particular for the empowerment of women and girls.
“A Plea for KR,” Synthese 2019.
Abstract
There is a strong case to be made for thinking that an obscure logic, KR, is better than classical logic and better than any relevant logic. The argument for KR over relevant logics is that KR counts disjunctive syllogism valid, and this is the biggest complaint about relevant logics. The argument for KR over classical logic depends on the normativity of logic and the paradoxes of implication. The paradoxes of implication are taken by relevant logicians to justify relevant logic, but considerations on the normativity of logic show that only some of the paradoxes of implication are genuine. KR avoids all the genuine paradoxes of implication, unlike classical logic. Overall, KR avoids the genuine paradoxes of implication and avoids the major objection to relevant logics. This combination of features provides strong reason to give KR a place in the conversation about the right logic(s).
“The Irrationality of Anticipatory Guilt,” The Moral Psychology of Guilt, B. Cokelet and C. Maley, eds. R & L Intl, 2019.
Abstract
Most emotion research considers present-time emotions, some focus on retrospective emotions, but few consider future emotions. This distinction between present-time, retrospective, and anticipatory emotions is about the object of the emotion (i.e., what the emotion is about)—not when the emotion is felt. Guilt, in particular, is most often considered retrospectively—more often than not, we think about instances of guilt concerning something from the past. Because backward-looking guilt typically receives more attention, examining it as a case for forward- looking emotions could shed new light on guilt. I present a worry for how to make sense of anticipatory guilt according to the traditional assessments, and motivate another problem about anticipatory guilt—namely empirical findings that we systematically overestimate how much guilt we would feel in a given situation. I argue that despite the empirical results on overestimation, anticipatory guilt is not irrational.
“Envy in the Philosophical Tradition,” (with Justin D’Arms) Envy: Theory and Research. R. Smith, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009: 39-59.
Abstract
This chapter draws attention to the sophistication of the historical tradition on this topic. Another is to familiarize researchers in other disciplines with some empirical claims in this tradition that may be ripe for empirical re-examination. Yet another is to broach some questions that perhaps lie more squarely within the purview of philosophy than psychology, concerning what envy is about and when (if ever) it might be rational or appropriate to be envious. We raise these questions here in the confidence that, whatever terminological and methodological differences may distinguish contemporary philosophy from other disciplines, the substance of these questions will be both recognizable and gripping to anyone with enough interest in envy to have opened this book.
Under Review / In Preparation
“After ‘Sex’,” in preparation.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” The Moral Psychology of Fear, L. Ware, ed. R & L Intl, invited.
“Traditional Assessments and Warrant*,” in preparation.
“The End of Vagueness: Epistemicism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Explainable Artificial Intelligence,” (w Kevin Scharp), R&R.
The Information in Emotion Communication, (w Kevin Scharp) under review.
“What’s the Message in Emotion Communication,” (w Kevin Scharp) under review.
“Erotic Precarity,” (w Lauren Ware) in preparation.
Talks/Presentations
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Invited Keynote Speaker for Early Career Conference in Philosophy of Perception & Responsibility, Lund University, 5/2022
“After ‘Sex’,” Work-in-Progress, The Scottish Feminist Philosophy Network, 10/2021.
“Warrant* and Dynamic Emotional Rationality,” European Philosophical Society for the
Study of Emotions, 6/2021.
“To Envy an Algorithm,” Moral Psychology of Envy Workshop, 5/2021.
Invited Panelist, “Parenthood, Climate Justice, and the Ethics of Care: Notes Towards a Queer
Analysis,” Queer Epistemicide, 4/2021.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” University of Stirling, 12/2020.
“After ‘Sex’,” The Implementation Challenge for Conceptual Engineering, Arché Workshop, University of St Andrews, 12/2020.
“Erotic Precarity,” (w Lauren Ware), MANCEPT, University of Manchester, 9/2020.
“Warrant* and Dynamic Emotional Rationality,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Graz, Austria, 6/2020. —cancelled for pandemic —
“Climate Crisis: Evil, Gender, and Affect in History and Philosophy,” (w Mara van der Lugt and Camilla Rostvick) 2020 Conference of International Society for Intellectual History, Florence, Italy, 5/2020. —cancelled for pandemic--
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Keynote Speaker, St Andrews Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, St Andrews, 2/2020.
“After ‘Sex’,” Philosophies of Race, Class, and Gender, Munich, Germany, 1/2020.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Reflectorium, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 1/2020.
Women in Philosophy Round Table, The Philosophical Society and MAP, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 11/2019.
Sexual Assault Round Table, Saints LGBTQ+, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 11/2019.
“Emotional Testimony – Case Study of The Gruffalo,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Pisa, Italy, 6/2019.
“Gender,” St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies Launch Event, 12/2018.
“Alexa and the Promotion of Oppression,” WomEncourage, Association for Computing Machinery, Belgrade, Serbia, 10/2018.
“There’s No Such Thing as Sex,” The Philosophical Society/Shag Week, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 10/2018.
“Anthropopathism, God, and Affective Science,” Logia, LOGOS Institute, St. Mary’s Divinity, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 10/2018.
“The Irrationality of Anticipatory Guilt,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Tallinn, Estonia, 6/2018.
“‘Sex’ Doesn’t Discriminate, We Can All Do It!” Sexpression, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 2/2018.
“A Plea for KR,” Arché Colloquium, St Andrews, 6/2017.
“Feeling in Reasoning,” Reasons First, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, 5/2017.
“Feminist Philosophy,” International Women’s Day, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 3/2017.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” The Philosophical Society, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 2/2017.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Reflectorium, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 12/2016.
“Imprudence and the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Workshop of the Mentoring Project for Pre-Tenure Women Faculty in Philosophy; University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 6/2015.
“Emotional Rationality and the Traditional Assessments,” Philosophy of Mind Group, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 10/2014.
“Emotional Irrationality: Imprudence,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Lisbon, Portugal, 7/2014.
Invited comments on Dana Howard’s “On Reasonable Hope,” Political Theory Workshop, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 3/2014.
Invited comments on Daniel Silvermint’s “Race and Virtuous Resistance,” Workshop on the to Resist Oppression, University of Connecticut; Storrs, CT, 9/2013.
“Relationship Norms,” Philosophy Club, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 2/2010.
“Emotions: Static vs. Dynamic Assessments,” Australasian Association of Philosophy; Melbourne, Australia, 7/2009.
“Vagueness: Contextual and Inconsistent,” Arché Colloquium, University of St Andrews; St Andrews, 11/2007.
- Research Communities -
RESEARCH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies
I was the Founding Director of the St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies (StAIGS). at the University of St Andrews. It is the largest and the most interdisciplinary institute in the university with over 160 members (132 academic staff members from over 23 departments) helping to realise several of the key aims in the University Strategy (2018-2023), and contributing to our School’s successful Athena Swan application. The Institute’s main research objective is to provide a hub of collaboration and activity for gender theorists at the university. Minimally, this addresses the previous well-founded complaints about gender-related events happening on campus that people did not know were happening. But, even more significantly, the institute now provides a power platform from which to launch external funding bids, it being an obvious and ideal place for gender theorists to collaborate and carry out their work. Throughout my time at St Andrews and before, I have engaged in collaboration with other members of staff and with academics at other universities.
Research Activism for Intersectional Justice
I am currently working as the founding director of the Centre for Research Activism for Intersectional Justice. With a team of six other established scholars in distinct fields (e.g., law, media studies, geography) we are developing several programmes (e.g., ethics of research, disability and accessibility policy, bias in facial recognition, global political structures especially in the developing world) that are set to launch later this spring. This centre brings current research connected to ethics, law, policy, and governance to current activist and practical measures with aims to bring many separate communities together for genuine and substantial impact. This centre involves collaborations between universities like Aberdeen, Leeds, and Oxford.
Research Community Involvement
The Scottish Feminist Philosophy Network
European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
My research focuses the philosophy of emotion and the many ways in which emotions contribute to our overall rationality. My views of what an emotion is are influenced by theories in both philosophy and psychology. In general, I try to have my views on emotional rationality be consistent with a wide range of theories concerning what is an emotion. More recently, my research has been focusing on anticipatory emotions, emotion regulation, and the roles that emotions play in social communication.
Writing
Publications
“Emotion Regulation as Resurrection: Disability & Music,” (w Rebecca Jiggens) Embodying the Music & Death Nexus: Consolations, Salvations, & Transformations, J. Shadrack, ed., forthcoming.
Abstract
In this chapter, we consider music as a tool for emotional regulation in relation to disability, which can be employed to counter the dehumanisation of disabled people that arises from unregulated emotional responses to disability. Responding to Julia Kristeva’s presentation of non-disabled encounters with disability as causing a physical or psychical death, Alison Duncan Kerr’s arguments on the rationality of regulating emotions in encounters where unregulated emotions have negative effects on the self and others are brought together through Rebecca Jiggens’ cultural model of understanding the significance of disability to illustrate the irrationality and moral paucity of ableism. We argue that music can play a role in regulating the emotions typically felt towards the disabled. Kristeva’s idea that disability wounds or even kills the abled is insightful, but if we are right, then the tight connection between death and emotional reactions to disability could be overcome through the process of emotion regulation.
“To Envy an Algorithm,” The Moral Psychology of Envy, S. Protasi, ed. R & L Intl, 2022.
Abstract
One of the biggest concerns for artificial intelligence (AI) is the interaction between humans and artificially intelligent agents. There is no evolutionary precedent that dictates how these interactions ought to take place or how best to understand these interactions. We are still learning as a species how to socially interact with AI. Within this context, it is natural to emphasise the elements of human experience, like emotions, that are usually only directed at other humans. Emotions are commonly thought of as a uniquely human phenomenon—though there is strong evidence that other animals experience emotions as well (Paul and Mendl 2018). In particular, social emotions (e.g., envy, jealousy, guilt, embarrassment) are especially difficult to understand in the context of interactions with AI agents. This chapter focuses on one aspect of this challenge: the propriety of feeling envy toward an algorithm, a computer programme, a machine, or a robot. By ‘propriety’ I mean whether it can be fitting to feel envy towards an AI agent. I focus on the AI agent AlphaGo, as a case study where it might appear reasonable for one to feel envious of AI. I argue that, in the right circumstances, one can feel a fitting (and warranted) bout of envy toward an algorithm. Having an emotion toward an object need not require the object capable of feeling an emotion itself. One can feel envy toward an algorithm, like AlphaGo; this bout of envy can be both fitting and warranted.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Philosophical Psychology 34.4, 2021: 453-473.https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1915969
Abstract
Much of the recent work in psychology (and affective science) has shown that humans regulate their emotions nearly constantly, sometimes well and sometimes poorly. I argue that properly regulating one’s emotions displays emotional rationality, and failing to do so displays emotional irrationality. If an agent feels an emotion that is obviously problematic for the agent to feel and she is aware that it is problematic, then the agent ought to regulate her emotions in future similar situations. To capture this aspect of emotional rationality, I introduce the concept of imprudence, which is meant to capture a familiar way that we assess each other’s emotions, despite the fact that it has yet to be a factor in the literature on emotions in philosophy, psychology, or affective science.
“Artificial Intelligence, Gender, and Oppression,” Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, W. L. Filho, ed. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95687-9_107
Abstract
This chapter focuses on one particular type of injustice that AI technologies and applications can cause, gendered oppression.
“Emotions, Rationality, and Gender,” Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, W. L. Filho, ed. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95687-9_106
Abstract
This chapter argues about the detriment of the gendered perspective on emotions and the overall benefit of better understanding of emotions for all people, but in particular for the empowerment of women and girls.
“A Plea for KR,” Synthese 2019.
Abstract
There is a strong case to be made for thinking that an obscure logic, KR, is better than classical logic and better than any relevant logic. The argument for KR over relevant logics is that KR counts disjunctive syllogism valid, and this is the biggest complaint about relevant logics. The argument for KR over classical logic depends on the normativity of logic and the paradoxes of implication. The paradoxes of implication are taken by relevant logicians to justify relevant logic, but considerations on the normativity of logic show that only some of the paradoxes of implication are genuine. KR avoids all the genuine paradoxes of implication, unlike classical logic. Overall, KR avoids the genuine paradoxes of implication and avoids the major objection to relevant logics. This combination of features provides strong reason to give KR a place in the conversation about the right logic(s).
“The Irrationality of Anticipatory Guilt,” The Moral Psychology of Guilt, B. Cokelet and C. Maley, eds. R & L Intl, 2019.
Abstract
Most emotion research considers present-time emotions, some focus on retrospective emotions, but few consider future emotions. This distinction between present-time, retrospective, and anticipatory emotions is about the object of the emotion (i.e., what the emotion is about)—not when the emotion is felt. Guilt, in particular, is most often considered retrospectively—more often than not, we think about instances of guilt concerning something from the past. Because backward-looking guilt typically receives more attention, examining it as a case for forward- looking emotions could shed new light on guilt. I present a worry for how to make sense of anticipatory guilt according to the traditional assessments, and motivate another problem about anticipatory guilt—namely empirical findings that we systematically overestimate how much guilt we would feel in a given situation. I argue that despite the empirical results on overestimation, anticipatory guilt is not irrational.
“Envy in the Philosophical Tradition,” (with Justin D’Arms) Envy: Theory and Research. R. Smith, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009: 39-59.
Abstract
This chapter draws attention to the sophistication of the historical tradition on this topic. Another is to familiarize researchers in other disciplines with some empirical claims in this tradition that may be ripe for empirical re-examination. Yet another is to broach some questions that perhaps lie more squarely within the purview of philosophy than psychology, concerning what envy is about and when (if ever) it might be rational or appropriate to be envious. We raise these questions here in the confidence that, whatever terminological and methodological differences may distinguish contemporary philosophy from other disciplines, the substance of these questions will be both recognizable and gripping to anyone with enough interest in envy to have opened this book.
Under Review / In Preparation
“After ‘Sex’,” in preparation.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” The Moral Psychology of Fear, L. Ware, ed. R & L Intl, invited.
“Traditional Assessments and Warrant*,” in preparation.
“The End of Vagueness: Epistemicism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Explainable Artificial Intelligence,” (w Kevin Scharp), R&R.
The Information in Emotion Communication, (w Kevin Scharp) under review.
“What’s the Message in Emotion Communication,” (w Kevin Scharp) under review.
“Erotic Precarity,” (w Lauren Ware) in preparation.
Talks/Presentations
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Invited Keynote Speaker for Early Career Conference in Philosophy of Perception & Responsibility, Lund University, 5/2022
“After ‘Sex’,” Work-in-Progress, The Scottish Feminist Philosophy Network, 10/2021.
“Warrant* and Dynamic Emotional Rationality,” European Philosophical Society for the
Study of Emotions, 6/2021.
“To Envy an Algorithm,” Moral Psychology of Envy Workshop, 5/2021.
Invited Panelist, “Parenthood, Climate Justice, and the Ethics of Care: Notes Towards a Queer
Analysis,” Queer Epistemicide, 4/2021.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” University of Stirling, 12/2020.
“After ‘Sex’,” The Implementation Challenge for Conceptual Engineering, Arché Workshop, University of St Andrews, 12/2020.
“Erotic Precarity,” (w Lauren Ware), MANCEPT, University of Manchester, 9/2020.
“Warrant* and Dynamic Emotional Rationality,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Graz, Austria, 6/2020. —cancelled for pandemic —
“Climate Crisis: Evil, Gender, and Affect in History and Philosophy,” (w Mara van der Lugt and Camilla Rostvick) 2020 Conference of International Society for Intellectual History, Florence, Italy, 5/2020. —cancelled for pandemic--
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Keynote Speaker, St Andrews Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, St Andrews, 2/2020.
“After ‘Sex’,” Philosophies of Race, Class, and Gender, Munich, Germany, 1/2020.
“Fear of the Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony,” Reflectorium, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 1/2020.
Women in Philosophy Round Table, The Philosophical Society and MAP, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 11/2019.
Sexual Assault Round Table, Saints LGBTQ+, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 11/2019.
“Emotional Testimony – Case Study of The Gruffalo,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Pisa, Italy, 6/2019.
“Gender,” St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies Launch Event, 12/2018.
“Alexa and the Promotion of Oppression,” WomEncourage, Association for Computing Machinery, Belgrade, Serbia, 10/2018.
“There’s No Such Thing as Sex,” The Philosophical Society/Shag Week, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 10/2018.
“Anthropopathism, God, and Affective Science,” Logia, LOGOS Institute, St. Mary’s Divinity, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 10/2018.
“The Irrationality of Anticipatory Guilt,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Tallinn, Estonia, 6/2018.
“‘Sex’ Doesn’t Discriminate, We Can All Do It!” Sexpression, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 2/2018.
“A Plea for KR,” Arché Colloquium, St Andrews, 6/2017.
“Feeling in Reasoning,” Reasons First, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, 5/2017.
“Feminist Philosophy,” International Women’s Day, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 3/2017.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” The Philosophical Society, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 2/2017.
“On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Reflectorium, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 12/2016.
“Imprudence and the Rationality of Emotion Regulation,” Workshop of the Mentoring Project for Pre-Tenure Women Faculty in Philosophy; University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 6/2015.
“Emotional Rationality and the Traditional Assessments,” Philosophy of Mind Group, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 10/2014.
“Emotional Irrationality: Imprudence,” European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Lisbon, Portugal, 7/2014.
Invited comments on Dana Howard’s “On Reasonable Hope,” Political Theory Workshop, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 3/2014.
Invited comments on Daniel Silvermint’s “Race and Virtuous Resistance,” Workshop on the to Resist Oppression, University of Connecticut; Storrs, CT, 9/2013.
“Relationship Norms,” Philosophy Club, The Ohio State University; Columbus, OH, 2/2010.
“Emotions: Static vs. Dynamic Assessments,” Australasian Association of Philosophy; Melbourne, Australia, 7/2009.
“Vagueness: Contextual and Inconsistent,” Arché Colloquium, University of St Andrews; St Andrews, 11/2007.
- Research Communities -
RESEARCH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies
I was the Founding Director of the St Andrews Institute for Gender Studies (StAIGS). at the University of St Andrews. It is the largest and the most interdisciplinary institute in the university with over 160 members (132 academic staff members from over 23 departments) helping to realise several of the key aims in the University Strategy (2018-2023), and contributing to our School’s successful Athena Swan application. The Institute’s main research objective is to provide a hub of collaboration and activity for gender theorists at the university. Minimally, this addresses the previous well-founded complaints about gender-related events happening on campus that people did not know were happening. But, even more significantly, the institute now provides a power platform from which to launch external funding bids, it being an obvious and ideal place for gender theorists to collaborate and carry out their work. Throughout my time at St Andrews and before, I have engaged in collaboration with other members of staff and with academics at other universities.
Research Activism for Intersectional Justice
I am currently working as the founding director of the Centre for Research Activism for Intersectional Justice. With a team of six other established scholars in distinct fields (e.g., law, media studies, geography) we are developing several programmes (e.g., ethics of research, disability and accessibility policy, bias in facial recognition, global political structures especially in the developing world) that are set to launch later this spring. This centre brings current research connected to ethics, law, policy, and governance to current activist and practical measures with aims to bring many separate communities together for genuine and substantial impact. This centre involves collaborations between universities like Aberdeen, Leeds, and Oxford.
Research Community Involvement
The Scottish Feminist Philosophy Network
European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions